Reading Torah on its Own Terms

A natural question for many Jews is: what does my religion require of me? Contemporary Jewish communities differ widely in how they understand obligation, ranging from strict halakhic frameworks to cultural or ethnic identity with limited ritual practice. This diversity raises a central interpretive issue: What sources define Jewish obligation?

Contemporary discourse often presents a binary choice between secular Jewish identity and full halakhic observance. Written Torah, however, presents a distinct interpretive model—one in which its teachings are directly accessible and self-contained, without reference to external interpretive authority. A reading focused solely on the written Torah yields a substantially smaller legal corpus than that articulated within rabbinic halakhic tradition.

Shmuel ben Joseph, J.D.

The Diversity of Jewish Observance

Approximate global patterns of observance reflect a broad spectrum of relationships to halakhic authority :

• Secular - ~ 40%

  Identify as Jewish through ancestry or ethnicity; halakha not observed; holidays marked primarily in cultural forms.

• Cultural - ~ 20%

  Identify as Jewish; halakha not binding; observe selected customs such as the Passover seder, High Holiday attendance, and lighting Hannukah candles.

• Reform/Progressive/Liberal - ~15%

  Halakha not binding; ethical religious emphasis; ritual observance optional; synagogue affiliation and lifecycle practices common.

• Conservative - ~10%

  Halakha regarded as important but interpreted flexibly; Shabbat and holiday practice more regular; generally egalitarian.

• Modern/Centrist Orthodox - ~ 7%

  Halakha binding; full Shabbat observance, kashrut, and daily prayer; integrated participation in secular education and professions

• Haredi/Ultra-Orthodox - ~ 7%

  Strict halakhic observance; limited integration with secular culture.

• Other - ~ 1%

  Including Reconstructionist, Renewal, Humanistic, Karaite, Samaritan communities.

Halakhic Tradition and its Components

In rabbinic Judaism, halakha designates a comprehensive body of Jewish law consisting of:

1. the written Torah,

2. the oral traditions later compiled in the Mishnah (ca. 200 CE),

3. the discussions and expansions in the Jerusalem and Babylonian Talmuds, and

4. subsequent post-Talmudic interpretation.

For many Jews, even those in secular, cultural, or Reform communities, this full rabbinic structure is assumed to define what it means to be observant.

Yet rabbinic tradition’s conception of an authoritative Oral Law—transmitted at Sinai but committed to writing centuries later—stands in contrast to the way written Torah presents its own scope[i].

The comparison below examines the contrast between (a) what the written Torah explicitly identifies as required, and (b) the broader set of obligations developed within rabbinic tradition. The contrast reflects significantly different understandings of Torah observance.

What Torah Claims about the Scope of its Teaching 

Several passages in Deuteronomy describe the Torah’s teachings as complete, sufficient, and authoritative in written form.

Deuteronomy 13:5-6 directs Israel to follow only the law God has given, warning against deviation:

Fol­low none but the Lord your God, and revere none but Him; observe His commandments alone, and heed only His orders; worship none but Him, and hold fast to Him. As for that prophet or dream-diviner, he shall be put to death; for he urged disloyalty to the Lord your God—who freed you from the land of Egypt and who redeemed you from the house of bondage—to make you stray from the path that the Lord your God commanded you to follow. 

Deuteronomy 26:16-19 identifies the “laws and rules” as those presented to the people in Moses’ teaching:

The Lord your God commands you this day to observe these laws and rules; observe them faithfully with all your heart and soul. You have affirmed this day that the Lord is your God, that you will walk in His ways, that you will observe His laws and com­mandments and rules, and that you will obey Him.

 And the Lord has affirmed this day that you are, as He promised you, His treasured people who shall observe all His commandments, and that He will set you, in fame and renown and glory, high above all the nations that He has made; and that you shall be, as He promised, a holy people to the Lord your God.

Deuteronomy 30:9-10 explicitly links God’s commandments and laws to what is recorded in “this book of the Teaching”:

For the Lord will again delight in your well-being, as He did in that of your fathers, since you will be heeding the Lord your God and keeping His commandments and laws that are recorded in this book of the Teaching—once you return to the Lord your God with all your heart and soul.

Deuteronomy 4:1-2 (cf. 13:1) prohibits adding to or subtracting from the commands Moses delivers:

And now, O Israel, give heed to the laws and rules that I am instructing you to observe, so that you may live to enter and occupy the land that the Lord, the God of your fathers, is giving you.

You shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it, but keep the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon you.

Taken together, these passages depict the written Torah as a self-sufficient legal corpus, without reference to a parallel unwritten law. Rabbinic tradition, in contrast, treats the Oral Law as a necessary interpretive companion to the written text.

Interpretive Tension Between Written and Oral Law 

Deuteronomy characterizes Torah’s instruction as simple, accessible, and directly understandable. Deuteronomy 30:11-14 explains “this instruction” as “not in heaven,” “not beyond the sea,” and “very close to you… to observe it”: 

Surely, this Instruction which I enjoin upon you this day is not too baffling for you, nor is it beyond reach. It is not in the heavens, that you should say, “Who among us can go up to the heavens and get it for us and impart it to us, that we may observe it?” Neither is it beyond the sea, that you should say, “Who among us can cross to the other side of the sea and get it for us and impart it to us, that we may ob­serve it?” No, the thing is very close to you, in your mouth and in your heart, to observe it. 

Deuteronomy 31:9-13 instructs that the “this Teaching” be read aloud publicly every seven years so that all Israel–men, women, children, and resident strangers–can hear and learn its teaching directly: 

Moses wrote down this Teaching and gave it to the priests, sons of Levi, who carried the Ark of the Lord’s Covenant, and to all the elders of Israel.

And Moses instructed them as follows: Every sev­enth year, the year set for remission, at the Feast of Booths, when all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the place that He will choose, you shall read this Teaching aloud in the presence of all Israel. Gather the people—men, women, children, and the strangers in your communities—that they may hear and so learn to revere the Lord your God and to observe faithfully every word of this Teaching. Their children, too, who have not had the experience, shall hear and learn to revere the Lord your God as long as they live in the land that you are about to cross the Jordan to possess.

These passages portray written Torah as a finite text designed to be heard, understood, and observed without mediation.

Rabbinic tradition presents a contrasting framework: that the written Torah requires an accompanying oral interpretation to determine its proper application. Thus, the written Torah’s portrayal of direct accessibility differs from rabbinic Judaism’s tradition-centered model of interpretation.

Examples of Interpretive Divergence 

Vocalization of the Text

Rabbinic tradition maintains that the written Torah cannot be fully understood without the vocalization preserved in oral transmission. Hebrew readers note, however, that the consonantal text is readable and grammatically interpretable without an oral supplement.

Circumcision

Rabbinic literature derives many circumcision laws from the Oral Law. The written Torah depicts Abraham performing circumcision without Sinai instruction, (Gen. 17:9-14), and Zipporah doing the same before Sinai. (Exod. 4:24-26).

Not Boiling a Kid in its Mother’s Milk

The prohibition appears three times (Exod. 23:19, 34:26, Deut. 14:21). Rabbinic tradition develops this into a comprehensive set of dietary regulations­–including separation of milk and meat and dedicated cookware­­–not specified in the written text.

Tefillin

Exodus 13:9 and 13:16 describe the law as a sign and a remembrance:

…it shall be for a sign upon your hand, and for a remembrance between your eyes…

Deuteronomy 6:8 and 11:8 expand that formulation:

You shall bind them as a sign upon your hand, and they shall be as frontlets between your eyes.

Rabbinic tradition interprets these literally developing the practice of tefillin. A textual reading can interpret the same phrases figuratively, expressing that the Teaching should constantly guide one’s actions (“hand”), and remembered continually to orient what one sees (“eyes”).[ii] 

The distinction is not without theological implication. A literal rabbinic approach focuses observance on the physical acts of binding and placing, whereas a figurative approach focuses on binding written Torah to all one’s conduct and remembering it to filter all that one sees.

Rabbinic halakha incorporates many obligations not explicit in the written Torah. Jews who are not already halakha-observant may perceive that an observant life necessarily accepts the entire rabbinic corpus, which may discourage engaging the written text itself to identify an observant life grounded solely in its text.

Judicial Authority in Deuteronomy 17 

Deuteronomy 17:8-11 describes a centralized judicial mechanism for resolving difficult concrete legal disputes arising in the community:

If a case is too baffling for you to decide, be it a controversy over homicide, civil law, or assault—matters of dispute in your courts—you shall promptly repair to the place that the Lord your God will have chosen, and appear before the Levitical priests, or the magistrate in charge at the time, and present your problem. When they have announced to you the verdict in the case, you shall carry out the verdict that is announced to you from that place that the Lord chose, observing scrupulously all their instructions to you. You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.

Rabbinic tradition interprets this passage as the basis for enduring halakhic authority.

A textual reading can understand this passage more narrowly: as establishing a case-specific process for resolving concrete disputes between people, rather than authorizing an ongoing interpretive body capable of issuing binding rulings untethered to specific cases[iii]. 

Conclusion: Reading Torah on its own Terms

The development of rabbinic halakha produces a broad, complex legal system that extends well beyond the explicit requirements of the written Torah. This complexity may lead many Jews to assume that observance requires accepting rabbinic tradition. That assumption may discourage attempting to engage with the written Torah on its own terms, even though the written Torah presents itself as a complete and accessible teaching.  

A Jew approaching the written Torah as a self-contained legal corpus encounters a set of requirements that are straightforward: foundational prohibitions such as idolatry, murder, theft, and coveting, as examples, together with positive commands aimed at cultivating reverence, gratitude, and trust in God’s covenant and commitment to us. Within this framework, observance centers on moral conduct, atonement for failure, and practices that keep the Torah’s teaching continually between our eyes.

Endnotes:

[i] Rabbinic tradition maintains that, alongside the written Torah, an Oral Law was given to Moses at Sinai and transmitted through successive generations. The rabbinic corpus was first committed to writing in stages, beginning with the Mishnah (ca 200 C.E.), followed by the discussions recorded in the Jerusalem Talmud (ca. 350 C.E.) and the Babylonian Talmud (ca. 500 C.E.). For overviews, see Zev Farber, “Can the Torah Be a Moral Authority in Modern Times?” TheTorah (2021)

 The written Torah depicts God speaking laws to Moses, which Moses conveys to Israel and records in written Torah. As explained in Exodus 20:1:

And God spoke all these words, saying…

 Exodus 34:32 conveys Moses communicating to Israel what God had spoken:

 Afterward all the children of Israel came near, and he commanded them all that the LORD had spoken with him on Mount Sinai.

 Leviticus 26:46 states these were the laws, which Moses wrote:

These are the statutes and the judgments and the laws which the LORD made between Himself and the children of Israel on Mount Sinai, by the hand of Moses.

These create a textual frame in which the written Torah presents itself containing the commandments, statutes and laws as spoken by God.

Rabbinic literature holds that Oral Law was originally not to be written (Gittin 60b), and explains its eventual codification as a concession to necessity from the risk of being lost during exile (Temurah 14b, Rav Sherira Gaon, Iggeret). For discussion, see also Shayna Sheinfeld, “Yelamdeinu Rabbeinu: The Exclusivity of the Oral Law” TheTorah.com (2016)

The existence and later codification of an extensive oral tradition creates a model in which two interconnected bodies of teaching–one written and one transmitted through rabbinic interpretation, operate together. Under this model, access to the full scope of Jewish law proceeds through the interpretive structures of the Oral Law and the authorities who preserve and apply it.  This differs from a textual reading that approaches the written Torah as a self-contained legal corpus, its meaning the reader derives directly from the written text.

These approaches reflect different relationships to the written text. A tradition-centered model situates interpretation within accumulated teachings, while a text-centered model situates interpretation between the written teaching and the reader to apply in daily life. Each framework shapes the reader’s engagement with the Torah in distinct ways.

[ii] These four verses do not specify the making of a physical object. A literal interpretation treats the verses as instructions to create and bind physical objects, whereas a figurative interpretation reads them as binding the teaching itself to one’s conduct (“hand”) and as a continual reminder that shapes what we perceive (“between the eyes”).

When the written Torah intends a physical object as a reminder of its teaching, it states this explicitly. An example is Numbers 15:37-40:

The Lord said to Moses as follows: Speak to the Israelite people and instruct them to make for them­selves fringes on the corners of their garments through­out the ages; let them attach a cord of blue to the fringe at each corner. That shall be your fringe; look at it and recall all the commandments of the Lord and ob­serve them, so that you do not follow your heart and eyes in your lustful urge. Thus you shall be reminded to observe all My commandments and to be holy to your God.

[iii] Legal systems often distinguish between rulings connected to concrete circumstances, and rulings issued in the absence of a specific case. For example, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence differentiates between “cases or controversies,” which involve identifiable facts, and “advisory opinions,” which do not arise from a particular dispute. This comparison illustrates how legal traditions may draw similar conceptual boundaries when defining the scope of judicial authority, but is not meant to imply any substantive connection with Torah.